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GEOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE IN WAR TIME

I. Background

- a. In speaking of geographic intelligence we separate out four sub-activities--1) Geographic analysis, 2) cartographic production, 3) photo interpretation, and 4) map procurement and reference.

Cartography, photo intelligence and maps ~~in wartime~~ treated in more detail

tomorrow, as part of the presentation on Central Support Services *in Wartime*.

However, they comprise an integral part of the over-all geographic intelligence effort.

- b. First, to outline what we mean by geographic--the study of the location, identity and areal inter-relationship of physical and cultural features, ~~on the surface of the earth~~. In geography we locate, identify and interpret the distributional characteristics of physical elements such as terrain, climate, vegetation, hydrography--and cultural elements--population, resources, transportation, political administrative units, industry, disease, and ethnic groups.

~~In effect, we wish to know what is there, why it is there, and what~~

~~its present means.~~ In accomplishing these studies, the geographer is primarily a generalist and the map his principal methodological tool.

Research as applicable to the location of shopping centers as it is to

strategic situations of nations. All of us observe geographic factors in our daily activities.

- c. By very nature of its data, geographic intelligence strongly concerned with the support of operational and strategic planning. Chronicles significant changes in landscape and applies resultant data to broad background documents--NIS and regional analyses--or tightly-focused studies that interpret targets, routes, landing beaches, and/or population distribution with relation to specific operations.

By virtue of large store of interrelated data it establishes, geographic intelligence also useful in support of policy determination, estimates, and current reporting.

II. Development of Activity

Don't say
is factor *been recognized by*
~~Elements of Geography long of intense interest to~~ historians and military

commanders. Gibbon, for example, in his description of site and situation of Constantinople, provided one of the finest of all geographical analyses. On the military side, a terrain handbook (bound in leather) was prepared for Army operations in area between El Paso and Laredo in 1912.

However, World War II really spawned the organization and techniques of geographic intelligence as we accept them now. GFR concept of the role of geographic intelligence in wartime naturally reflects much learned during those years. As will be clear in latter part of talk, we do not anticipate all to be same as in World War II-- general principles only.

1. Development in Washington

- a. Americans entered World War II with few maps, essentially no geographic intelligence units, and very limited information on foreign territories. War period marked by large, frantic buildup of these resources.

b) Army, G-2--some 200 personnel-- Strategic Intelligence Studies--

now at ESID, AM3.

State Department--economic and political geography.

Navy, ONI--limited, hydrographic, landing, and naval facilities/ studies
primarily--CINCPAC-CINCPQA.

c) OSS--First geographers in OSS began work in R and A Branch in fall

of 1941, while still known as Coordinator of Information.

Grew eventually to 200-250 personnel.

Drew some basic ideas on geographic intelligence from British Inter-Service

Topographical Detachment, attached to the General Staff. ISTD already

producing geographical intelligence in the form of Inter-Service

Intelligence Studies, encyclopaedic in content but related to specific

operational planning. Research and Analysis Branch of OSS drew

upon concepts of ISTD in development of the JANIS publications and

(Army-Navy)
the Joint Intelligence Study Publishing Board.

Also, established separate Cartographic Section, Map Intelligence Section,
* terrain model shop, and * photo unit (in support of situation room).

Geographic intelligence--such as port and transportation studies for
JANIS-- accomplished by research units attached, along with economists *and other disciplines*
to each regional section of R and A.

Many headquarters applications of geographic intelligence clearly developed
in OSS at this time: foreign map procurement and exploitation; production
of wide range of special subject maps in support of OSS headquarters,
JCS, and Board of Economic Warfare requirements; team operation to
produce area intelligence in support of strategic planning and estimates.
Was no photo interpretation section, and little activity related to
operational planning.

2. Development in field

Experience in application of geographic intelligence to operational planning
developed mainly in field commands: OSS(London), OSS(China Theater),
and Cairo, Athens, Delhi, Ceylon worked on critically-important target

and terrain ^{analyzed} for clandestine operations in addition to cartographic and map procurement support. In China, geographers dropped with radio transmitters behind Japanese lines to observe and report on geographical facts required for operational planning of all sorts.

Single most comprehensive geographic intelligence activity in World War II was that of Allied Geographical Section of Southwest Pacific Command, which operated independently of Washington headquarters. AGS established in 1942 in response to immediate and critical necessity--the Command had to conduct operations in an area, which from the standpoint of available data, was a tierra incognita. Very few of the many facts required for planning and conduct of military operations were available for New Guinea, Solomons, or even much of Philippines.

Organization composed jointly of Americans-Australians-New Zealanders, both military and civilian. Mission--to prepare comprehensive JANIS ^{-type} regional studies, special reports and combat handbooks focused in content and timed in publication to coincide with the planning and

conduct of specific plans, estimates and operations. ^{while} Exploited whatever documentary material was available, and procured large amount of essential information from special interrogations, photo interpretation and reconnaissance. In conjunction with a central interrogation and translation service, AIS developed considerable amount of area ^{exp} expertise and ability to provide a great variety of intelligence on short notice. Great advantages, of course, were 1) wholly self-sufficient in skills and facilities; 2) group operated on the scene where most up-to-date sources of information were available; 3) could provide response to Command requirements without lags resulting from distance or conflicting priorities.

3. Present rationale

Experience in World War II established the following as desirable features of geographic intelligence operation:

- a) Should be team activity.
- b) Should make intensive use of photo interpretation techniques.
- c) Should maintain capability to apply techniques to wide range of requirements--strategic and operational planning, reporting, intelligence briefings, estimates--through emphasis on regional expertise in depth in addition to training in systematic fields of physiography, soils, demography, transportation, etc. Influence of German Milgeo and Margeo studies--analogous areas applied to operational planning.
- d) Should coordinate closely with other geographic elements of community in procurement and utilization of files.

Subsequent experiences in Korean War, particularly those of the military services, both confirmed appropriateness of team approach as it applies to geography, cartography and maps, and strongly established value of photo interpretation.

Geographic Research Area, GRR, presently so organized as to integrate

capabilities of these related activities. Capabilities in general the following:

- a) Regional analysis--potential missile ranges, new lands area,
- b) border studies--clandestine travel,
- c) route studies--economic estimates, clandestine travel,
- d) urban area analysis--intelligence needaker for collection and special operations,
- e) Unconventional Warfare--community support.
- f) Escape and Evasion--community support.
- g) target studies--heavy photo interpretation
- h) geographic trends and developments--intelligence on mapping, geodesy, gravimetry, Antarctica; photo intelligence surveillance. Background studies for planner reference--GM.
- i) spot queries--location, identity, status
- j) cartography--special-subject, or intelligence maps.

k) photo interpretation support--including area surveillance and development of hardware.

l) map procurement and reference--intelligence type maps, foreign and domestically procured.

III. War Plan

A. Planning for geographic intelligence in wartime envisions practically

no change from the present mission--based on concepts developed

and proven out through wartime experience. However, specific

types of support even the organizational structure to provide

them--difficult to estimate because (1) don't know type of

war that will be fought--cannot lean too heavily on last war

because may be an entirely new pattern of activities, with

different emphases on support required. (2) Support to non-CIA

agencies dependent first on coordinations that will be developed

we hope will in preparation for
on those already existing its contracts;

in course of war, and, second, on decisions that must be taken

regarding

~~the~~ continued dependence on that support by military services

concerned.

Primary approach thus to emphasize maintenance of great flexibility, and constantly widen capabilities of staff through special training and new experience.

B. Within these qualifications, we anticipate, first, an immediate and heavy load placed on geographic intelligence and services.

Large part of this load will be support of special operations, primarily those related to paramount national interests conducted by so-called 4th Force in overseas commands. We would envision that, subject to decision at the time, this field support would be provided by already-experienced field teams of geographic intelligence personnel capable of doing a full range of analysis--involving geographic research, cartography, map procurement and evaluation, and photo interpretation at short notice for any type of operational requirement.

C. At headquarters, we anticipate the following:

1. to contribute geographic intelligence and technical services to evaluations of current situations, followed by support requests

~~Secret~~

for area analysis and assistance from map reference service.

2. Next stage, rapid and concurrent increase in requests for photo interpretation, cartographic services, and geographic intelligence ^{research} support to targeting, unconventional warfare, and escape and evasion, and economic research requirements.

3. Finally, envision establishment of map collection teams in field commands; and prepare ^{examine on} special teams of geographic intelligence ^{to have in P/P} and service personnel for direct field support of CIA and military operations as required.

C. Build Up

^(3557d)
Personnel increase, except photo intelligence, of 42 percent. Accelerated training in cartography and photo interpretation. [Readying of map collection teams.]

D. Schedule

1. Deploy to relocation center, functioning within limitations of emergency facilities and staff.

~~Secret~~

2. Call in key graduate reservists.
3. Convert military reservists from civilian to military status in implementation of the DD/I plans for this.
4. Initiate phased call-in of other graduate reservists and recruitment from non-graduate of potential ~~civilian~~ reservists, lists.
5. Implement training and build up facilities.

E. Necessary Relationships with Rest of Intelligence Community

1. Assumes intimate working coordination with other agencies where joint operations are involved.
2. A continuation of the present close working ^{cooperation} coordination with other geographic intelligence research units--particularly that at Army Map Service.
3. Establishment of a community photographic intelligence center. ^{as appropriate,}
4. Verification of existing agreements for the coordination of foreign map procurement to include the principle that the coordinated procurement and processing of captured maps and map materials

will in wartime be a CIA responsibility.

5. Technical coordination with other cartographic services of the community, as necessary.